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Abstract 
Corporate governance is often regarded as a main driver of firm performance. However, previous studies often 
discover contradicting findings about the causal effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. In 
this paper, corporate governance literature will be reviewed with a focus on technology industry. Our paper 
shows that contemporary literature may overlook the industry and institutional context of technology firms. We 
propose that a fine-grained empirical setting is important in future research. In particular, the countervailing effect 
of high information asymmetries in high ownership concentration context may require more attention. Lastly, 
future studies of technology industries in emerging economies can be focused on the potential interaction effect 
between corporate governance mechanisms and firm investment. 








In general, firm performance of traditional and technology firms are affected by the varying 
economic cycles. However, unlike traditional firms, technology firms can be thought as unique 
business entities. 
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That is, firm performance of technology firms is driven by human capital component while technology 
firms  also  face  great  uncertainties  to  sustain  successive  market-centric  technological  
innovation effectively in the long run (Wu et al., 2005). Specifically, there are two kinds of uncertainties 
in high-tech industry: (i)  continuous yet  rapid  technology advancement, and  (ii)  high  volatility of  
technological product demands but low visibility of future trends. These challenges are more prominent 
in technology industries compared to traditional industries such as agribusiness, trading and service 
industries. Stated differently, the survival of the technology firms is dependent upon firm's decision-
making in response to rapid changing external environment. Undoubtedly, management capacity is an 
important value driver in the technology firm (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
Interestingly, many empirical studies have used broad samples across industries in corporate 
governance research. However, a study by Cui (2002) shows that using broad-based sample across 
industries will mask the specific characteristics in R&D intensive industries when investigating the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. In other words, the studies used 
industry definition as dichotomous variable(s) to incorporate unobserved industry effect(s) in 
empirical models may overlook industry effect on emerged corporate governance mechanisms. In a 
similar vain, Le et al. (2006) also point out that the impact of corporate governance mechanisms differs 
across industries. Thus, this paper intends to shed some lights on the potential research agendas about 
corporate governance in technology firms. 
 
2. Corporate Governance in Technology Firms 
 
2.1. Why corporate governance of technology firms is unique? 
 
Resource-based view suggests that firm's R&D investment is essentially relying on the 
managerial foresights to create strategic assets, which in turn establish competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). However, the great uncertainties in technology firms have caused high levels of information 
asymmetry between  insiders  and  outside  shareholders,  particularly in  terms  of  R&D  investment. 
This  can  be explained by the fact that R&D investment is incomparable and unique to each firm 
for following reasons. First, productivity of R&D investment is ambiguous to outsiders. In contrast, the 
economic significance of physical asset investment can be evaluated clearly, for example, outsiders can 
estimate the productivity of a newly opened store based on industry (or historical) data. Second, R&D 
investment is difficult to be evaluated accurately because it is classified as expenses in the financial 
statement. On the contrary, physical and financial assets can be evaluated based on the accounting 
fair value or market value. As a result, insiders possess significant information advantages in 
technology firms relative to outsiders. 
Similar arguments also can be detected from empirical studies that shows high information 
asymmetry becomes the determinant of rent-seeking behavior of insiders in technology industries. 
Recent study by Ahuja et al. (2005) show that in the United States, insiders capitalize on the 
information advantages in stock tradings because they have adequate information to foresee the impact 
of R&D investment on firm performance. In addition, a study by Aboody and Lev (2000) discovered 
that trading gains of insiders in R&D intensive industries are significantly higher than other industries 
in the United States. To re-iterate, the nature of technology industry creates a high information barrier 
to outsiders, whereas insiders often have timely and accurate information about R&D investment. 
 
2.2. Corporate governance of technology firms in Anglo-Saxon economies 
The diffused ownership structure of large firms in Anglo-Saxon countries is known as the root cause of 
agency conflicts in the firm (Porta et al., 1999). In relation to this, portfolio theory suggests that investors 
may diversify their portfolio to reduce the systematic risks. Thus, the diversified investors may not 
interested in firm's monitoring activities (Fama, 1980). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) posit that 
dispersed ownership context provides insufficient incentive for minority shareholders to assume the 
monitoring role on firm management. The dispersed ownership structure, therefore, tends to generate 
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Moreover, agency theory posits that information asymmetry exacerbates agency conflicts in the  firms. 
Thus, it is reasonable to  believe that agency conflicts in technology firms are more severe compared to 
other industries. 
With regard to technology firms in Anglo-Saxon economies, there are three widely adopted firm-level 
governance mechanisms, which are executive compensation scheme, managerial shareholdings and board 
independence  (Beatty  and  Zajac,  1994).  First,  Eisenhardt  (1989)  describes  that  principals  can  use 
outcome-based compensation contracts if the agent's behavior are difficult to be measured. The rationale 
is that when measurability of agent behavior is ambiguous, incentive-based contracts can be utilized to 
align agent's behavior with the desirable outcome. To illustrate, task programmability of management in 
technology firms is difficult to be observed especially in building intangible assets. Thus, the incentive- 
based contracts can be utilized to alter risk taking by agents through a combination type of compensation 
schemes such as fixed payment and incentive-based payment systems. These arguments are supported by 
a study by He and Wang (2009), who discovered that incentive-based compensation packages for 
executives  positively  moderate   the   relationship   between   R&D   investment  and   firm   value   of 
manufacturing firms in the United States. 
Second, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that agency conflicts in the firms can be alleviated by 
changing agents' risk bearing profile. That is, residual claimants of firm's net cash flows (e.g., common 
stocks)  can be given to the agents. As such, the interest of agents is aligned because they also become the 
principal of the firm. In line with such arguments, prior studies in technology industries (Le et al., 2006; 
He and Wang, 2009) found that managerial ownership leads to higher stock returns of firms. Le et al. 
(2006) concluded that managerial ownership is an efficient instrument to align interests between company 
executives and shareholders. 
Third, board of directors can play a direct role to monitor and discipline management (Fama, 1980). 
However, the problem arises when executive directors have strong control over the board, which allow 
them to expropriate shareholders and creditors (Fama, 1980). Thus, outside directors, who are commonly 
viewed as independent directors, are more likely to scrutinize firm decision-making. In the case of 
technology firms, prior empirical evidences have shown monitoring role of the board is ambiguous with 
respect to firm performance (Kor, 2006; He and Wang, 2009). For example, He and Wang (2009) 
discovered a non-significant relationship between the independent board and firm performance for 736 
manufacturing firms in the United States. Likewise, Kor (2006) discovered that a higher percentage of 
outside directors are not necessarily to be an effective governance mechanism for technology firm in 
terms of R&D spending. Kor (2006) concluded that while monitoring by independent board is beneficial 
to  firm  performance,  however,  high  monitoring  cost  of  the  board  may  outweigh  the  benefits. 
Interestingly, Zajac and Westphal (1994) provide an alternative explanation that suggests independent 
directors in technology industries may not have sufficient capability to monitor management because they 
could not understand complicated corporate strategies and R&D activities. 
Apart from firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, the monitoring by large shareholders 
and institutional investors is also the focal point in Anglo-Saxon economies. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) suggest that large shareholders are effective to monitor firm's management and possess the 
ability to initiate firm takeovers to protect their investment in the firms. This can be seen by the fact 
that large shareholders are more willing to take over the firm when their stake of shareholdings is 
larger. In addition, institutional investors are also regarded as professional investors who can monitor 
the management (Le et al. 2006). A study by Le et al. (2006) show that institutional investors have a 
positive effect on stock returns of technology firms in the United States. In other words, institutional 
investors are an effective government mechanism in technology firms. Likewise, another study by Kor 
(2006) shows that the presence of institutional investors in ownership structure can mitigate under-
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2.3. Corporate governance of technology firms in Asia 
 
Unlike Anglo-Saxon context, corporate ownership structure around the globe generally exhibits high 
levels of ownership concentrations (Porta et al., 1999). In East Asia, the concentration of wealth is 
prevalent and concentrated on families and governments (Claessens et al., 1999). For example, 
Malaysia and Singapore governments appear to be controlling shareholders on about 20% of  publicly 
listed firms in  each  country.  On  the  other  hand,  Indonesia  and  Thailand  governments also  have  
a  significant ownership in corporate sectors. Stated differently, families and government have strong 
control over the public listed firms in East Asia. 
High levels of ownership concentrations bring about unique corporate governance problems in Asia. 
Claessens and Fan (2002) explain that high ownership concentration makes the agency conflicts 
between management and shareholder less relevant in East Asia. As a matter of fact, many family-
controlled firms have no real separation between ownership interests and control, which denotes that 
they are also the insiders in the firms (Peng and Jiang, 2010). In turn, divergence of interests between 
controlling shareholders and other shareholders become the main concern in East Asia. This is also 
known as principal-to-principal conflicts. In addition, family-controlled firms often utilize pyramid 
structures and cross-holdings in firm controls, and result in deviation of control and cash-flow rights for 
family controlling shareholders (Porta et al., 1999). Thus, family controlling shareholders have strong 
incentive to transfer the wealth from minority shareholder to them. In relation to this, Claessens et al. 
(2002) discovered that deviation of cash-flow and control rights of controlling shareholders produce a 
negative impact on firm value based on a sample of 1301 East Asian firms in 1996, which is the 
evidence of expropriation of minority shareholders. 
Notably, state-controlled companies in South East Asia, such as Malaysia, Singapore and 
Philippines, generally exhibits separation of ownership and management (Claessens et al., 2000). While 
state ownership is regarded as an unique corporate governance mechanism in the Asia context 
(Ramírez and Tan, 2004, Ang and Ding, 2006), the controlling power gives government officials the 
rights to appoint directors on the board of directors and indirectly control firm management. Thus, 
profit-maximization may become a secondary objective in the firms because many Asian governments 
utilize state-controlled firms as the proxies to implement socioeconomic projects. Furthermore, 
Woidtke (2002) suggests that state ownership may not to be an effective governance mechanism 
because government per se is the agent of citizens. 
The diverse institutional development background in Asia countries cause the corporate 
governance issue unique in each country (Peng and Jiang, 2010). Specifically, the corporate governance 
instruments used in technology firms vary across countries in Asia. In Korea, Choi (2012a) investigated 
the effectiveness of ownership concentration and institutional investors as governance mechanisms for 
301 high-tech firms between 2002 and 2003. His findings show that ownership concentration is 
ineffective to monitor and influence the manager's behavior in R&D investment. In terms of ownership 
structure, the presence of institutional and foreign investors positively improve technological innovation 
performance of high-tech firms, whereas the opposite results is found for insider ownership and state 
ownership. Another study in Malaysia shows that family and managerial ownership have a negative 
impact on the performance of intellectual capital for technology firms listed on the MESDAQ market 
(Saleh et al., 
2009). Interestingly, the study also shows that the government and foreign ownership produce non- 
significant impact on building firm's intellectual capital. 
 
2.4. Corporate governance and business strategies 
 
Recent corporate governance literature has recommended that multi-theoretical perspectives is 
important to extend the limited explanation by agency theory when studying the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm performance in technology industries (He and Wang 2009; Boyd et 
al.,2011; Choi et al. 2012a). Specifically, Cui and Mak (2002) suggest that high-tech industries may 
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Our review shows that resource-based view is gaining popularity in corporate governance literature. 
Resource-based view posits that R&D spending is the main value driver of technology firms. 
Strategical management literature also shows that R&D spending positively affects the stock 
performance of manufacturing firms. In this regard, resource-based view becomes a competing 
theoretical framework for explaining corporate governance in technology industries. Till to date, 
several empirical studies have employed corporate strategy perspective and agency theory to 
investigate corporate governance mechanisms in technology industries in Anglo-Saxon economies (Kor, 
2006, He and Wang, 2009, Choi et al., 2012a). These empirical studies mainly focus on two lines of 
research. 
The first line of research emphasizes on the role of institutional investors on firm investment (Le et 
al. 
2006; He and Wang 2009). For example, the study by Le et al. (2006) in the United States shows that 
the institutional ownership positively moderate the relationship between R&D spending and stock 
performance. By contrast, He and Wang (2009) found that outside large shareholders negatively 
moderate the relationship between R&D spending and firm value. These results suggest that the type of 
large shareholders may be important to influence management's investment decisions. 
The second line of research attempts to examine the interaction effect between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms (i.e., independent board and CEO duality) and firm's R&D spending on 
firm performance (Le et al., 2006, He and Wang, 2009). On the one hand, He and Wang (2009) 
discovered that CEO duality positively moderate R&D spending on firm value (Tobin's Q). On the other 
hand, Le et al. (2006) found that independent board has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between R&D spending and firm performance. These results suggest CEO duality (i.e., 
less board independence) and board independence (i.e., measured by proportion of independent 
directors on the board) positively moderate the relationship between firm R&D investment on firm 
performance. It is important to note that the. board's monitoring effect is likely to be compromised 
because CEO duality structures gives high level of power concentration on CEOs. Thus, one question 





In conclusion, there is an increasing awareness that institutional context is unique, and this may lead 
to inconclusive empirical evidence regarding corporate governance mechanisms across countries (Fraser 
et al., 2006; Christensen et al.; 2010, Choi et al., 2012b). Previous studies have attempted to examine 
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia, and show that 
expropriation of minority shareholders is a prevalent phenomenon across industries during financial 
crisis. With regard to technology firms, higher information asymmetry may aggravate expropriation of 
minority shareholders by controlling shareholders. Thus far, however, little attention is given to the 
expropriation issue in technology  firms.  In  addition,  our  review  shows  empirical  studies  about  the  
effect  of  corporate governance mechanisms on firm decision-making in technology firms have mainly 
focused in the context of advanced economies. There is a lack of similar studies on emerging economies. 
Our paper reveals four important research agendas in the corporate governance literature. First, 
the tradeoff of  between  the  incentive  effect  of  ownership  concentration and  potential  
expropriation of minority shareholders in technology industries is an important issue to be studied. 
Second,   there is limited direct examination on how information asymmetries can reduce the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in technology industries. Third, we are still unclear 
about the function of ownership and board structure on R&D investment policy for technology  firms in 
emerging economies. Fourth, the moderating effect of internal corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., 
board independence and CEO duality) on the relationship between firm's R&D investment decision and 
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